DHCP Option for The Open Group's User Authentication Protocol
A DHCP option that provides URLs for User Authentication Protocol servers.
Drach, S., "DHCP Option for The Open Group's User Authentication Protocol", RFC 2485, DOI 10.17487/RFC2485, January 1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2485>.
@misc{rfc2485,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 2485,
howpublished = {RFC 2485},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC2485},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2485},
author = {S. Drach},
title = {{DHCP Option for The Open Group's User Authentication Protocol}},
pagetotal = 4,
year = 1999,
month = jan,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group S. Drach
Request for Comments: 2485 Sun Microsystems
Category: Standards Track January 1999
DHCP Option for The Open Group's User Authentication Protocol
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document defines a DHCP [1] option that contains a list of
pointers to User Authentication Protocol servers that provide user
authentication services for clients that conform to The Open Group
Network Computing Client Technical Standard [2].
Introduction
The Open Group Network Computing Client Technical Standard, a product
of The Open Group's Network Computing Working Group (NCWG), defines a
network computing client user authentication facility named the User
Authentication Protocol (UAP).
UAP provides two levels of authentication, basic and secure. Basic
authentication uses the Basic Authentication mechanism defined in the
HTTP 1.1 [3] specification. Secure authentication is simply basic
authentication encapsulated in an SSLv3 [4] session.
In both cases, a UAP client needs to obtain the IP address and port
of the UAP service. Additional path information may be required,
depending on the implementation of the service. A URL [5] is an
excellent mechanism for encapsulation of this information since many
UAP servers will be implemented as components within legacy HTTP/SSL
servers.
Most UAP clients have no local state and are configured when booted
through DHCP. No existing DHCP option [6] has a data field that
contains a URL. Option 72 contains a list of IP addresses for WWW
servers, but it is not adequate since a port and/or path can not be
specified. Hence there is a need for an option that contains a list
of URLs.
User Authentication Protocol Option
This option specifies a list of URLs, each pointing to a user
authentication service that is capable of processing authentication
requests encapsulated in the User Authentication Protocol (UAP). UAP
servers can accept either HTTP 1.1 or SSLv3 connections. If the list
includes a URL that does not contain a port component, the normal
default port is assumed (i.e., port 80 for http and port 443 for
https). If the list includes a URL that does not contain a path
component, the path /uap is assumed.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Length | URL list
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code 98
Length The length of the data field (i.e., URL list) in
bytes.
URL list A list of one or more URLs separated by the ASCII
space character (0x20).
References
[1] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
March 1997.
[2] Technical Standard: Network Computing Client, The Open Group,
Document Number C801, October 1998.
[3] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., and T.
Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC
2068, January 1997.
[4] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The SSL Protocol,
Version 3.0", Netscape Communications Corp., November 1996.
Standards Information Base, The Open Group,
http://www.db.opengroup.org/sib.htm#SSL_3.
[5] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L., and M. McCahill, "Uniform
Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994.
[6] Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.
Security Considerations
DHCP currently provides no authentication or security mechanisms.
Potential exposures to attack are discussed in section 7 of the DHCP
protocol specification.
The User Authentication Protocol does not have a means to detect
whether or not the client is communicating with a rogue
authentication service that the client contacted because it received
a forged or otherwise compromised UAP option from a DHCP service
whose security was compromised. Even secure authentication does not
provide relief from this type of attack. This security exposure is
mitigated by the environmental assumptions documented in the Network
Computing Client Technical Standard.
Author's Address
Steve Drach
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
901 San Antonio Road
Palo Alto, CA 94303
Phone: (650) 960-1300
EMail: drach@sun.com
Full Copyright Statement
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ISO Plain Language
On this page
§1Locating a UAP Authentication Service
The User Authentication Protocol (UAP) lets a client authenticate using a basic mechanism or a secure form carried in an SSLv3 session. In either case, the client needs the service's IP address and port, and some implementations may also need a path.
Many UAP clients have little local configuration and receive settings through DHCP when they boot. Existing DHCP options could provide web-server addresses but not a full URL with port and path, so the RFC defines an option carrying URLs.
A client needs to know where its authentication service is located. This DHCP option can provide the full URL, including a port or path when needed.
§1The URL List Option
The option contains one or more URLs for servers that process UAP authentication requests. URLs are separated by the ASCII space character, and the option uses code 98.
If a URL omits its port, the default is 80 for HTTP or 443 for HTTPS. If it omits its path, the assumed path is /uap.
The option gives the client a list of service URLs. The RFC defines default ports and a default path when those parts are left out.
§1A Forged DHCP Option Can Mislead a Client
The RFC notes that DHCP provides no authentication or security mechanism in the described setting. A forged or compromised option could direct a client to a rogue UAP service.
The document says that even secure UAP authentication does not protect against this kind of redirection. Its discussion points to environmental assumptions in the referenced Network Computing Client standard as the mitigation.
A client cannot rely on this option to prove that a server is trustworthy. If an attacker changes the DHCP response, the client may contact a rogue authentication service.