Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Domain-Based Service Names Mapping for the Kerberos V GSS Mechanism
Maps domain-based GSS-API service names into Kerberos V principal names.
Williams, N., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Domain-Based Service Names Mapping for the Kerberos V GSS Mechanism", RFC 5179, DOI 10.17487/RFC5179, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5179>.
@misc{rfc5179,
series = {Request for Comments},
number = 5179,
howpublished = {RFC 5179},
publisher = {RFC Editor},
doi = {10.17487/RFC5179},
url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5179},
author = {N. Williams},
title = {{Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Domain-Based Service Names Mapping for the Kerberos V GSS Mechanism}},
pagetotal = 5,
year = 2008,
month = may,
} RFC text
Contents
Network Working Group N. Williams
Request for Comments: 5179 Sun
Category: Standards Track May 2008
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
Domain-Based Service Names Mapping for the Kerberos V GSS Mechanism
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document describes the mapping of Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface (GSS-API) domain-name-based service
principal names onto Kerberos V principal names.
Table of Contents
1. Domain-Based Names for the Kerberos V GSS-API Mechanism . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Domain-Based Names for the Kerberos V GSS-API Mechanism
In accordance with [RFC5178], this document provides the mechanism-
specific details needed to implement GSS-API [RFC2743] domain-based
service names with the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC4121].
GSS_C_NT_DOMAINBASED_SERVICE name SHOULD be mapped to Kerberos V
principal names as follows:
o the <service> name becomes the first (0th) component of the
Kerberos V principal name;
o the <hostname> becomes the second component of the Kerberos V
principal name;
o the <domain> name becomes the third component of the Kerberos V
principal name;
o the realm of the resulting principal name is that which
corresponds to the domain name, treated as a hostname.
The same name canonicalization considerations and methods as used
elsewhere in the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism [RFC4121] and Kerberos
V [RFC4120] in general apply here.
Implementations SHOULD use a Kerberos V name-type of
NTT-SRVT-HST-DOMAIN (which has the value 12) but MAY use NT-UNKNOWN
instead.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Internationalization Considerations
It is unclear, at this time, how best to address internationalization
of Kerberos V domain-based principal names. This is because the
Kerberos V core protocol internationalization project is incomplete.
However, clearly the best way to interoperate when using Kerberos V
domain-based principal names is to use ACE-encoded internationalized
domain names [RFC3490] for the hostname and domain name slots of a
Kerberos V domain-based principal name. Therefore Kerberos V GSS-API
mechanism implementations MUST do just that.
4. Examples
o The domain-based name, of generic form,
"ldap@foo.example@ds1.foo.example" may map to a Kerberos V
principal name like: "ldap/ds1.foo.example/
foo.example@FOO.EXAMPLE"
o The domain-based name, of generic form,
"kadmin@foo.example@kdc1.foo.example" may map to a Kerberos V
principal name like: "kadmin/kdc1.foo.example/
foo.example@FOO.EXAMPLE"
5. Security Considerations
See [RFC5178].
It is important for the security of protocols using the Kerberos V
GSS-API mechanism and domain-based names, that the realm of domain-
based principal names be derived from the hostname, rather than the
domain name slots of the input domain-based name string.
6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
July 2005.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
July 2005.
[RFC5178] Williams, N. and A. Melnikov, "Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
Internationalization and Domain-Based Service Names and
Name Type", RFC 5178, May 2008.
Author's Address
Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct.
Austin, TX 78727
US
EMail: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
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ISO Plain Language
On this page
§1Mapping the Name Components
For a domain-based service name, the service becomes the first Kerberos V principal component, the hostname the second, and the domain the third. The realm corresponds to the domain name treated as a hostname.
The RFC says the same name-canonicalization considerations used elsewhere in Kerberos V and its GSS-API mechanism apply.
The input has three parts, and each has a defined place in the Kerberos principal. The domain also determines the realm.
§2Kerberos Name Type
Implementations SHOULD use the Kerberos V name type NTT-SRVT-HST-DOMAIN, whose value is 12. They MAY use NT-UNKNOWN instead.
The RFC gives examples of LDAP and kadmin service names mapped to Kerberos principal forms.
The RFC gives a preferred name-type label and allows an unknown-type label as an alternative.
§3Internationalized Names and Security
The RFC says it is unclear how best to handle internationalization because the Kerberos V core internationalization work was incomplete. For interoperability, implementations MUST use ACE-encoded internationalized domain names in the hostname and domain slots.
For security, the realm of a domain-based principal name must be derived from the hostname rather than the input domain-name slot, as stated in the RFC's security section.
Internationalized domain names use an encoded form in these name parts. The RFC also specifies which input part must determine the realm.