RFC 4013 PROPOSED STANDARD SECURITY · UNICODE · AUTHENTICATION

SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords

A preparation profile that rewrites Unicode user names and passwords into one canonical form before they are compared.

On rfc-editor.org ↗
PUBLISHED
March 2005
AUTHORS
K. Zeilenga
STREAM
IETF
OBSOLETED BY
RFC 7613 — Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of Internationalized Strings Representing Usernames and Passwords
UNICODE VERSION USED
Unicode 3.2
NORMALIZATION FORM
KC
SPACE CODE POINT
U+0020
REGISTRY
stringprep profile registry
PROFILE VERSION
First version
DOI
10.17487/RFC4013
ERRATA
Reported errata

RFC text

Contents
Original text · RFC Editor View on rfc-editor.org ↗
Network Working Group                                        K. Zeilenga
Request for Comments: 4013                           OpenLDAP Foundation
Category: Standards Track                                  February 2005


       SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document describes how to prepare Unicode strings representing
   user names and passwords for comparison.  The document defines the
   "SASLprep" profile of the "stringprep" algorithm to be used for both
   user names and passwords.  This profile is intended to be used by
   Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms (such as
   PLAIN, CRAM-MD5, and DIGEST-MD5), as well as other protocols
   exchanging simple user names and/or passwords.

1.  Introduction

   The use of simple user names and passwords in authentication and
   authorization is pervasive on the Internet.  To increase the
   likelihood that user name and password input and comparison work in
   ways that make sense for typical users throughout the world, this
   document defines rules for preparing internationalized user names and
   passwords for comparison.  For simplicity and implementation ease, a
   single algorithm is defined for both user names and passwords.

   The algorithm assumes all strings are comprised of characters from
   the Unicode [Unicode] character set.

   This document defines the "SASLprep" profile of the "stringprep"
   algorithm [StringPrep].

   The profile is designed for use in Simple Authentication and Security
   Layer ([SASL]) mechanisms, such as [PLAIN], [CRAM-MD5], and
   [DIGEST-MD5].  It may be applicable where simple user names and
   passwords are used.  This profile is not intended for use in
   preparing identity strings that are not simple user names (e.g.,
   email addresses, domain names, distinguished names), or where
   identity or password strings that are not character data, or require
   different handling (e.g., case folding).

   This document does not alter the technical specification of any
   existing protocols.  Any specification that wishes to use the
   algorithm described in this document needs to explicitly incorporate
   this document and provide precise details as to where and how this
   algorithm is used by implementations of that specification.

2.  The SASLprep Profile

   This section defines the "SASLprep" profile of the "stringprep"
   algorithm [StringPrep].  This profile is intended for use in
   preparing strings representing simple user names and passwords.

   This profile uses Unicode 3.2 [Unicode].

   Character names in this document use the notation for code points and
   names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode].  For example, the letter
   "a" may be represented as either <U+0061> or <LATIN SMALL LETTER A>.
   In the lists of mappings and the prohibited characters, the "U+" is
   left off to make the lists easier to read.  The comments for
   character ranges are shown in square brackets (such as "[CONTROL
   CHARACTERS]") and do not come from the standard.

   Note: A glossary of terms used in Unicode can be found in [Glossary].
   Information on the Unicode character encoding model can be found in
   [CharModel].

2.1.  Mapping

   This profile specifies:

      -  non-ASCII space characters [StringPrep, C.1.2] that can be
         mapped to SPACE (U+0020), and

      -  the "commonly mapped to nothing" characters [StringPrep, B.1]
         that can be mapped to nothing.

2.2.  Normalization

   This profile specifies using Unicode normalization form KC, as
   described in Section 4 of [StringPrep].

2.3.  Prohibited Output

   This profile specifies the following characters as prohibited input:

      - Non-ASCII space characters [StringPrep, C.1.2]
      - ASCII control characters [StringPrep, C.2.1]
      - Non-ASCII control characters [StringPrep, C.2.2]
      - Private Use characters [StringPrep, C.3]
      - Non-character code points [StringPrep, C.4]
      - Surrogate code points [StringPrep, C.5]
      - Inappropriate for plain text characters [StringPrep, C.6]
      - Inappropriate for canonical representation characters
        [StringPrep, C.7]
      - Change display properties or deprecated characters
        [StringPrep, C.8]
      - Tagging characters [StringPrep, C.9]

2.4.  Bidirectional Characters

   This profile specifies checking bidirectional strings as described in
   [StringPrep, Section 6].

2.5.  Unassigned Code Points

   This profile specifies the [StringPrep, A.1] table as its list of
   unassigned code points.

3.  Examples

   The following table provides examples of how various character data
   is transformed by the SASLprep string preparation algorithm

   #  Input            Output     Comments
   -  -----            ------     --------
   1  I<U+00AD>X       IX         SOFT HYPHEN mapped to nothing
   2  user             user       no transformation
   3  USER             USER       case preserved, will not match #2
   4  <U+00AA>         a          output is NFKC, input in ISO 8859-1
   5  <U+2168>         IX         output is NFKC, will match #1
   6  <U+0007>                    Error - prohibited character
   7  <U+0627><U+0031>            Error - bidirectional check

4.  Security Considerations

   This profile is intended to prepare simple user name and password
   strings for comparison or use in cryptographic functions (e.g.,
   message digests).  The preparation algorithm was specifically
   designed such that its output is canonical, and it is well-formed.

   However, due to an anomaly [PR29] in the specification of Unicode
   normalization, canonical equivalence is not guaranteed for a select
   few character sequences.  These sequences, however, do not appear in
   well-formed text.  This specification was published despite this
   known technical problem.  It is expected that this specification will
   be revised before further progression on the Standards Track (after
   [Unicode] and/or [StringPrep] specifications have been updated to
   address this problem).

   It is not intended for preparing identity strings that are not simple
   user names (e.g., distinguished names, domain names), nor is the
   profile intended for use of simple user names that require different
   handling (such as case folding).  Protocols (or applications of those
   protocols) that have application-specific identity forms and/or
   comparison algorithms should use mechanisms specifically designed for
   these forms and algorithms.

   Application of string preparation may have an impact upon the
   feasibility of brute force and dictionary attacks.  While the number
   of possible prepared strings is less than the number of possible
   Unicode strings, the number of usable names and passwords is greater
   than as if only ASCII was used.  Though SASLprep eliminates some
   Unicode code point sequences as possible prepared strings, that
   elimination generally makes the (canonical) output forms practicable
   and prohibits nonsensical inputs.

   User names and passwords should be protected from eavesdropping.

   General "stringprep" and Unicode security considerations apply.  Both
   are discussed in [StringPrep].

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document details the "SASLprep" profile of the [StringPrep]
   protocol.  This profile has been registered in the stringprep profile
   registry.

      Name of this profile: SASLprep
      RFC in which the profile is defined: RFC 4013
      Indicator whether or not this is the newest version of the
      profile: This is the first version of the SASPprep profile.

6.  Acknowledgement

   This document borrows text from "Preparation of Internationalized
   Strings ('stringprep')" and "Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for
   Internationalized Domain Names", both by Paul Hoffman and Marc
   Blanchet.  This document is a product of the IETF SASL WG.

7.  Normative References

   [StringPrep]  Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
                 Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
                 December 2002.

   [Unicode]     The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
                 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version
                 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000.  ISBN 0-201-
                 61633-5), as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex
                 #27: Unicode 3.1"
                 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the
                 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2"
                 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).

8.  Informative References

   [Glossary]    The Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Glossary",
                 <http://www.unicode.org/glossary/>.

   [CharModel]   Whistler, K. and M. Davis, "Unicode Technical Report
                 #17, Character Encoding Model", UTR17,
                 <http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr17/>, August
                 2000.

   [SASL]        Melnikov, A., Ed., "Simple Authentication and Security
                 Layer (SASL)", Work in Progress.

   [CRAM-MD5]    Nerenberg, L., "The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism", Work in
                 Progress.

   [DIGEST-MD5]  Leach, P., Newman, C., and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest
                 Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", Work in Progress.

   [PLAIN]       Zeilenga, K., Ed., "The Plain SASL Mechanism", Work in
                 Progress.

   [PR29]        "Public Review Issue #29: Normalization Issue",
                 <http://www.unicode.org/review/pr-29.html>, February
                 2004.

Author's Address

   Kurt D. Zeilenga
   OpenLDAP Foundation

   EMail: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org

Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

ISO Plain Language

On this page
PROBLEMUser names and passwords typed by people around the world reach a server as Unicode text, and two spellings of the same name can differ in ways that a byte-by-byte comparison will not notice.
MECHANISMSASLprep is a profile of the stringprep algorithm. It maps some characters, normalizes the result to Unicode normalization form KC, rejects a list of prohibited characters, checks bidirectional strings and lists unassigned code points.
THE OUTCOMEThe prepared form is canonical, so two spellings that differ only in the ways the profile removes compare equal. The profile was registered in the stringprep profile registry under the name SASLprep.

§1Why SASLprep Exists

Simple user names and passwords are used pervasively on the Internet for authentication and authorization. People type them with their own keyboards and in their own scripts, so the same account can reach a server as several different sequences of bytes. RFC 4013 defines rules for preparing such strings so that the comparison a server performs matches what a person expected.

For simplicity and implementation ease, a single algorithm is defined for both user names and passwords. The profile is named SASLprep and is a profile of the stringprep algorithm. It is intended for use by Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanisms such as PLAIN, CRAM-MD5 and DIGEST-MD5, and by other protocols that exchange simple user names or passwords.

The profile is not intended for preparing identity strings that are not simple user names, such as email addresses, domain names or distinguished names, and not for strings that require different handling, such as case folding. The algorithm assumes that all strings are made of characters from the Unicode character set.

SASLprep makes two spellings of the same user name or password become the same string before the server compares them. It is meant for plain user names and passwords, not for email addresses or domain names.

§2The Five Steps of the Profile

The profile builds on stringprep and uses Unicode 3.2. It has five steps.

Mapping. Non-ASCII space characters that can be mapped to SPACE (U+0020) are mapped to it, and the characters that stringprep calls commonly mapped to nothing are mapped to nothing. Normalization. The string is normalized using Unicode normalization form KC, as described in Section 4 of stringprep.

Prohibited output. The profile names the following characters as prohibited input: non-ASCII space characters, ASCII control characters, non-ASCII control characters, private use characters, non-character code points, surrogate code points, characters inappropriate for plain text, characters inappropriate for canonical representation, characters that change display properties or are deprecated, and tagging characters. Bidirectional characters. Bidirectional strings are checked as described in Section 6 of stringprep. Unassigned code points. The stringprep table A.1 is the list of unassigned code points for this profile.

The profile runs five steps on a string. It maps some characters to other characters or removes them, normalizes what is left, refuses a list of unusable characters, checks the order of right-to-left and left-to-right text, and lists the code points that are not yet assigned.

THE FIVE STEPS OF THE SASLprep PROFILE
  • MappingNon-ASCII spaces become SPACE (U+0020); some characters are mapped to nothing.
  • NormalizationThe string is normalized to Unicode normalization form KC.
  • Prohibited outputControl, private use, surrogate, tagging and other listed characters are refused.
  • Bidirectional checkRight-to-left and left-to-right text is checked as stringprep describes.
  • Unassigned code pointsThe stringprep table A.1 is the list of unassigned code points.

§3Worked Examples

The RFC gives a table of examples showing how the algorithm transforms character data.

  • I<U+00AD>X becomes IX, because SOFT HYPHEN is mapped to nothing.
  • user stays user, with no transformation.
  • USER stays USER: case is preserved, so it does not match the second example.
  • <U+00AA> becomes a. The output is in form NFKC and the input was in ISO 8859-1.
  • <U+2168> becomes IX. The output is in form NFKC, so it will match the first example.
  • <U+0007> is an error, because the character is prohibited.
  • <U+0627><U+0031> is an error, because it fails the bidirectional check.

The examples show that differences in how a name is typed can disappear: a soft hyphen is removed and a Roman numeral becomes letters. Case is kept, so user and USER stay different.

THE EXAMPLES TABLE FROM RFC 4013
Input, output and comments
#  Input            Output     Comments
1  I<U+00AD>X       IX         SOFT HYPHEN mapped to nothing
2  user             user       no transformation
3  USER             USER       case preserved, will not match #2
4  <U+00AA>         a          output is NFKC, input in ISO 8859-1
5  <U+2168>         IX         output is NFKC, will match #1
6  <U+0007>                    Error - prohibited character
7  <U+0627><U+0031>            Error - bidirectional check

§4Security Considerations

The profile is intended to prepare simple user name and password strings for comparison or use in cryptographic functions such as message digests. The preparation algorithm was specifically designed so that its output is canonical and well formed.

The RFC records one known problem. Because of an anomaly in the specification of Unicode normalization, canonical equivalence is not guaranteed for a select few character sequences. Those sequences, however, do not appear in well-formed text. The specification was published despite this known technical problem, and was expected to be revised before it progressed further on the Standards Track, after the Unicode and stringprep specifications were updated to address the problem.

Application of string preparation has an impact on the feasibility of brute force and dictionary attacks. The number of possible prepared strings is less than the number of possible Unicode strings, but the number of usable names and passwords is greater than it would be if only ASCII were used. Eliminating some Unicode code point sequences as possible prepared strings generally makes the canonical output forms practicable and prohibits nonsensical inputs.

User names and passwords should be protected from eavesdropping, and the general stringprep and Unicode security considerations apply.

Preparation makes the prepared form canonical, so the same text always compares the same way. It slightly shrinks the number of possible passwords an attacker has to guess, but it also allows more names than plain ASCII would. User names and passwords still need protection from anyone listening on the network.

§5IANA Considerations

The RFC details the SASLprep profile of the stringprep protocol and states that this profile has been registered in the stringprep profile registry. The registry entry records the name of the profile as SASLprep, the RFC in which the profile is defined as RFC 4013, and the indicator whether or not this is the newest version of the profile as the first version.

The profile is registered in the stringprep registry under the name SASLprep, and this document is marked as its first version.

§6References

[StringPrep]RFC 3454Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.January 2003
[Unicode]The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0", as amended by Unicode Standard Annex #27 and Annex #28.
[CharModel]Whistler, K. and M. Davis, "Unicode Technical Report #17, Character Encoding Model", UTR17, August 2000.
[PR29]"Public Review Issue #29: Normalization Issue", February 2004.