RFC 6996 BEST CURRENT PRACTICE BGP · AS NUMBERS

Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for Private Use

Reserves a second, much larger block of AS numbers for networks that do not need globally unique ones.

On rfc-editor.org ↗
PUBLISHED
July 2013
AUTHORS
J. Mitchell
STREAM
IETF
BUILDS ON
RFC 1930 — AS Guidelines
16-BIT PRIVATE RANGE
64512 - 65534
16-BIT BLOCK SIZE
1023 ASNs
32-BIT PRIVATE RANGE
4200000000 - 4294967294
32-BIT BLOCK SIZE
94,967,295 ASNs
DOI
10.17487/RFC6996

RFC text

Contents
Original text · RFC Editor View on rfc-editor.org ↗
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Mitchell
Request for Comments: 6996                         Microsoft Corporation
BCP: 6                                                         July 2013
Updates: 1930
Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721


           Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for Private Use

Abstract

   This document describes the reservation of Autonomous System Numbers
   (ASNs) that are for Private Use only, known as Private Use ASNs, and
   provides operational guidance on their use.  This document enlarges
   the total space available for Private Use ASNs by documenting the
   reservation of a second, larger range and updates RFC 1930 by
   replacing Section 10 of that document.

Status of This Memo

   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   The original IANA reservation of Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) for
   Private Use was a block of 1023 ASNs.  This was also documented by
   the IETF in Section 10 of [RFC1930].  Since the time that the range
   was reserved, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] has seen
   deployment in new application domains, such as data center networks,
   which require a larger Private Use AS space.

   Since the introduction of "BGP Support for Four-Octet Autonomous
   System (AS) Number Space" [RFC6793], the total size of ASN space has
   increased dramatically.  A larger subset of the space is available to
   network operators to deploy in these Private Use cases.  The existing
   range of Private Use ASNs is widely deployed, and the ability to
   renumber this resource in existing networks cannot be coordinated
   given that these ASNs, by definition, are not registered.  Therefore,
   this RFC documents the existing Private Use ASN reservation while
   also introducing a second, larger range that can also be utilized.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Private Use ASNs

   To allow the continued growth of BGP protocol usage in new network
   applications that utilize Private Use ASNs, two ranges of ASNs are
   reserved by Section 5 of this document.  The first is part of the
   original 16-bit Autonomous System range previously defined in
   [RFC1930], and the second is a larger range out of the Four-Octet AS
   Number Space [RFC6793].

4.  Operational Considerations

   If Private Use ASNs are used and prefixes originate from these ASNs,
   Private Use ASNs MUST be removed from AS path attributes (including
   AS4_PATH if utilizing a four-octet AS number space) before being
   advertised to the global Internet.  Operators SHOULD ensure that all
   External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) speakers support the
   extensions described in [RFC6793] and that implementation-specific
   features that recognize Private Use ASNs have been updated to
   recognize both ranges prior to making use of the newer, numerically
   higher range of Private Use ASNs in the four-octet AS number space.
   Some existing implementations that remove Private Use ASNs from the
   AS_PATH are known to not remove Private Use ASNs if the AS_PATH
   contains a mixture of Private Use and Non-Private Use ASNs.  If such
   implementations have not been updated to recognize the new range of
   ASNs in this document and a mix of old and new range Private Use ASNs
   exist in the AS4_PATH, these implementations will likely cease to
   remove any Private Use ASNs from either of the AS path attributes.
   Normal AS path filtering MAY also be used to prevent prefixes
   originating from Private Use ASNs from being advertised to the global
   Internet.

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has reserved, for Private Use, a contiguous block of 1023
   Autonomous System numbers from the "16-bit Autonomous System Numbers"
   registry, namely 64512 - 65534 inclusive.

   IANA has also reserved, for Private Use, a contiguous block of
   94,967,295 Autonomous System numbers from the "32-bit Autonomous
   System Numbers" registry, namely 4200000000 - 4294967294 inclusive.

   These reservations have been documented in the IANA "Autonomous
   System (AS) Numbers" registry [IANA.AS].

6.  Security Considerations

   Private Use ASNs do not raise any unique security concerns.  Loss of
   connectivity might result from their inappropriate use, specifically
   outside of a single organization, since they are not globally unique.
   This loss of connectivity is limited to the organization using
   Private Use ASNs inappropriately or without reference to Section 4.
   General BGP security considerations are discussed in [RFC4271] and
   [RFC4272].  Identification of the originator of a route with a
   Private Use ASN in the AS path would have to be done by tracking the
   route back to the neighboring globally unique AS in the path or by
   inspecting other attributes.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC6793]  Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
              Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793,
              December 2012.

7.2.  Informative References

   [IANA.AS]  IANA, "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/>.

   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
              BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.

   [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
              RFC 4272, January 2006.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to acknowledge Christopher Morrow, Jason
   Schiller, and John Scudder for their advice on how to pursue this
   change.  The author would also like to thank Brian Dickson, David
   Farmer, Jeffrey Haas, Nick Hilliard, Joel Jaeggli, Warren Kumari, and
   Jeff Wheeler for their comments and suggestions.

Author's Address

   Jon Mitchell
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   USA

   EMail: Jon.Mitchell@microsoft.com

ISO Plain Language

On this page
PROBLEMThe original block of 1023 private AS numbers was too small for new BGP uses such as data center networks, and it cannot be renumbered because private numbers are not registered.
MECHANISMIANA keeps the range 64512 - 65534 from the 16-bit registry and reserves a second, larger range, 4200000000 - 4294967294, from the 32-bit registry.
WHY IT MATTERSOperators get far more private AS numbers, but private ASNs MUST be removed from AS paths before routes are advertised to the global Internet.

§1Why a Bigger Private Range

The original IANA reservation of Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) for Private Use was a block of 1023 ASNs, also documented by the IETF in Section 10 of RFC 1930. Since that range was reserved, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) has seen deployment in new application domains, such as data center networks, which require a larger Private Use AS space.

Since the introduction of four-octet AS number space in RFC 6793, the total size of ASN space has increased dramatically, so a larger subset of the space is available to network operators for these Private Use cases. The existing range is widely deployed and cannot be renumbered, because these ASNs, by definition, are not registered. The RFC therefore documents the existing reservation while introducing a second, larger range.

The old private range had only 1023 numbers and cannot be changed, because private numbers are not registered anywhere. This RFC keeps the old range and adds a much bigger one.

§3The Two Private Use Ranges

Two ranges of ASNs are reserved: the first is part of the original 16-bit Autonomous System range defined in RFC 1930, and the second is a larger range out of the four-octet AS number space. Section 5 of the RFC records the reservations in the IANA "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers" registry.

IANA has reserved, for Private Use, a contiguous block of 1023 Autonomous System numbers from the 16-bit registry, namely 64512 - 65534 inclusive. IANA has also reserved a contiguous block of 94,967,295 Autonomous System numbers from the 32-bit registry, namely 4200000000 - 4294967294 inclusive.

There are two private ranges: 64512 to 65534 in the old numbering, and 4200000000 to 4294967294 in the new four-octet numbering.

The two Private Use ASN ranges reserved by RFC 6996
RegistryRangeBlock size
16-bit64512 - 655341023 ASNs
32-bit THIS RFC4200000000 - 429496729494,967,295 ASNs

§4Operational Rules

If Private Use ASNs are used and prefixes originate from these ASNs, the Private Use ASNs MUST be removed from AS path attributes, including AS4_PATH if a four-octet AS number space is used, before being advertised to the global Internet. Normal AS path filtering MAY also be used to prevent prefixes originating from Private Use ASNs from being advertised to the global Internet.

Operators SHOULD ensure that all External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) speakers support the four-octet extensions and that features recognizing Private Use ASNs have been updated to recognize both ranges before the newer, numerically higher range is used. Some existing implementations do not remove Private Use ASNs from the AS_PATH when the path contains a mixture of private and non-private ASNs; if they do not know the new range, they will likely cease to remove Private Use ASNs from either path attribute.

Private numbers must be taken out of the path before a route is shared with the wider Internet. The equipment doing that must know about the new range first, or it may stop stripping them.

§6Security Considerations

Private Use ASNs do not raise any unique security concerns. Loss of connectivity might result from their inappropriate use outside a single organization, since they are not globally unique, and that loss is limited to the organization using them inappropriately or without following the operational rules.

Identification of the originator of a route with a Private Use ASN in the AS path has to be done by tracking the route back to the neighboring globally unique AS in the path, or by inspecting other attributes. General BGP security considerations are discussed in RFC 4271 and RFC 4272.

Misusing a private number mainly breaks your own network. Finding who originated such a route means following it back to the nearest registered network.

§5References